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A DEFENSE OF SENATE BILL 1391: THE CALIFORNIA LAW
THAT ABOLISHES TRANSFERRING JUVENILES UNDER SIXTEEN
TO CRIMINAL COURT
Nicole Connell*
I. INTRODUCTION
Daniel Mendoza was fourteen years old when he was arrested for
murder.1 Raised by a single mother, Mendoza’s family struggled to
secure basic necessities.2 The family also lived in a dangerous
neighborhood, and by age fourteen, Mendoza had joined a local gang.3
Police arrested Mendoza when he and several other gang members beat
a forty-four-year-old man to death.4 The attack erupted out of a turf war
for gang territory.5 Jose Maria Barajas, the victim of the killing, was not
a member of a rival gang but simply lived nearby.6 As a fourteen-yearold gang member charged with murder, Mendoza was tried in criminal
court and faced a life sentence in an adult prison.7 He was then given an
opportunity that most juveniles tried in criminal courts are not:
Mendoza was allowed to remain in juvenile custody while he finished
high school and then proceeded to take online college courses.8 His case
was transferred back to juvenile court shortly after finishing his
education, and Mendoza earned early release based on his progress.9
Now Mendoza, who will be twenty-four this year, is a graduate of the

*J.D. Candidate, 2021, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., Manhattan College.
1 Robert Salonga, Reformed Bay Area Teen Convicts Push Pending Bill to Spare Young
Offenders, MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 26, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.mercurynews.com/
2018/09/26/reformed-teen-convicts-push-pending-bill-to-young-offenders.
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id.
7 Salonga, supra note 1; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FUTURES DENIED: WHY CALIFORNIA
SHOULD NOT PROSECUTE 14- AND 15-YEAR-OLDS AS ADULTS 21 (2018), https://www.hrw.org/
sites/default/files/supporting_resources/futures_denied.pdf.
8 Salonga, supra note 1.
9 Id.
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University of California at Davis.10 Mendoza also earned the Brandon
Harrison Youth Leader/Youth Organizer Award in 2018, recognizing
him for his leadership.11 Mendoza credits the opportunities he was
given in the juvenile system for his change, calling them “integral to
growth.”12 Once facing life-long imprisonment in the criminal system,
Mendoza now refers to himself as “a taxpayer and a productive member
of society.”13
Mendoza has been a strong advocate of Senate Bill 1391,14 an
amendment to California’s Welfare and Institutions Code, which
governs juvenile offenders that are tried and sentenced in criminal
(instead of juvenile) court.15 Senate Bill 1391 bans the transfer of
juveniles under the age of sixteen to criminal court, regardless of the
alleged offense.16 Mendoza was vocal in telling his story as an example
of how the juvenile system allows and enables young juvenile offenders
to change.17 Mendoza points out that almost all juvenile offenders will
get out eventually: “We have to decide whether we want them to come
out worse than when they came in.”18 In September of 2018, California
Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 1391, amending the Welfare
and Institutions Code as of January 2019.19 The amendment, still
commonly referred to as Senate Bill 1391, has been criticized by District
Attorneys’ offices,20 journalists,21 and victims of crimes perpetrated by

10

Daniel “Data” Mendoza, FATHERS & FAMILIES OF SAN JOAQUIN, https://www.ffsj.org/
leadership/daniel-data-mendoza (last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
11 Julia Ann Easley, Convicted of Murder as Youth, UC Davis Student to be Honored for
Leadership, UC DAVIS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.ucdavis.edu/news/convictedmurder-youth-uc-davis-student-be-honored-leadership.
12 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 21.
13 Salonga, supra note 1.
14 Id.
15 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019).
16 S.B. 1391, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018).
17 Salonga, supra note 1.
18 Id.
19 Alexei Koseff, Jerry Brown Limits Prosecution of Minors to ‘Work Toward a More
Just System, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 30, 2018, 8:50 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/
news/politics-government/capitol-alert/article219287990.html.
20 See, e.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior
Court, Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (arguing that Senate Bill 1391
is unconstitutional and criticizing its removal of judicial discretion to consider juvenile
punishments in the “most dangerous cases”).
21 See, e.g., Marcos Bretón, Gov. Brown, If You Don’t Veto a Bill to Protect Young Killers,
You Create a Legacy of Pain, SACRAMENTO BEE (Sept. 16, 2018, 2:00 AM), https://www.sac
bee.com/news/local/news-columns-blogs/marcos-breton/article218396140.html
(arguing that Senate Bill 1391 does not protect the public or respect victims).
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fourteen and fifteen-year-olds.22 Much of the criticism focuses on the
constitutionality of the amendment, which is currently being questioned
in lower courts throughout California.23 But its constitutionality is not
the only controversy surrounding Senate Bill 1391; arguments
regarding public safety, fairness, accountability, and punishment have
been raised against the amendment as well. While multiple sources,
primarily some California courts,24 have rebutted arguments regarding
Senate Bill 1391’s constitutionality, a comprehensive reply to all of the
opposition to the amendment is lacking.
This Comment will fill that void by identifying and addressing the
major arguments, outside of the constitutionality debate, against Senate
Bill 1391. Part II of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the
juvenile justice system’s history and purpose in both the United States
as a whole and California. Part III of this Comment will explain and
refute major criticisms of Senate Bill 1391: (1) the argument that Senate
Bill 1391 is soft on juvenile crime and puts public safety at risk, and (2)
the argument that Senate Bill 1391 goes too far in completely
eliminating prosecutorial and judicial discretion in the transferring of
youth under sixteen years old to criminal court. This Comment will
show that Senate Bill 1391 furthers the main goal of the juvenile justice
system by promoting juvenile rehabilitation and protects juveniles of
differing backgrounds from disparate treatment while maintaining
public safety through other provisions of the Welfare and Institutions
Code.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM: HISTORY AND PURPOSE
The history of juvenile justice systems throughout the United
States makes clear that the main purpose of these systems is to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders and steer them away from the criminal
22 See, e.g., id. (quoting Nicole Clavo, mother of a murder victim, calling Senate Bill
1391 “‘a slap in the face’ to the families of victims”); Darrell Smith, Sacramento’s
‘Community of Victims’ Fight Law Shortening Sentences for Young Killers, SACRAMENTO BEE
(March 31, 2019, 2:40 AM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/local/article2283878
09.html (quoting Victoria Hurd, daughter of a murder victim, stating that Senate Bill
1391 “hits victims of atrocious crimes below the belt”).
23 E.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555 (Ct. App. 2019)
(upholding the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391); People v. Superior Court (I.R.), 251
Cal. Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2019) (upholding the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391);
People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.), 246 Cal. Rptr. 3d 712 (Ct. App. 2019) (upholding
the constitutionality of Senate Bill 1391); O.G. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. Rptr. 3d 904
(Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional).
24 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555; People v. Superior
Court (I.R.), 251 Cal. Rptr. 3d 158; People v. Superior Court (Alexander C.), 246 Cal. Rptr.
3d 712.
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path. This Part will demonstrate why courts have deemed it
appropriate to treat juvenile offenders differently than adult offenders
and how juvenile treatment focuses on rehabilitation. This Part will also
describe the distinct goals of California’s juvenile justice system, as well
as how the state has sought to achieve these goals through the Welfare
and Institutions Code. Finally, this Part will provide an overview of
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which governs the
transfer of juveniles to the criminal system, and how it has been
amended in recent years, concluding with Senate Bill 1391.
A. The United States
Before the mid-nineteenth century, juvenile justice systems did not
exist, and criminal courts tried both minors and adults for their crimes.25
But the mid-nineteenth century saw a shift in the treatment of juveniles
as cities and states throughout the country opened Houses of Refuge.26
New York State opened the first House of Refuge, or juvenile
reformatory school, in 1825.27 Houses of Refuge were a pretext to
juvenile justice systems, with the United States’ first juvenile court
opening in Cook County, Illinois, in 1899.28 As juvenile courts were
created throughout the nation, the doctrine of parens patriae became
prevalent for governing these new juvenile court systems.29 Under the
doctrine of parens patriae, the state—specifically the judge—acted as a
“parent” and determined what was in the minor’s best interests,
focusing specifically on youth offenders’ rehabilitation.30 This doctrine
even allowed juvenile courts to curtail the wishes of the biological
parent in certain contexts.31 Because the judge was to act in the minor’s
best interest, the procedural safeguards and due process rights
traditionally afforded to criminal defendants were unavailable to
25 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, JUVENILE CRIME, JUVENILE JUSTICE: PANEL ON
JUVENILE CRIME: PREVENTION, TREATMENT, AND CONTROL 157 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001).
26 See Chaz Arnett, Criminal Law: Virtual Shackles: Electronic Surveillance and the
Adultification of Juvenile Courts, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 399, 414 (2018).
27 Our City Charities.; The New-York House of Refuge for Juvenile Delinquents. N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 23, 1860), https://www.nytimes.com/1860/01/23/archives/our-citycharities-the-newyork-house-of-refuge-for-juvenile.html.
28 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 157.
29 See Tavil Peterson, Mandatory Transfer of Juveniles to Adult Court: A Deviation
from the Purpose of the Juvenile Justice System and A Violation of Their Eighth Amendment
Rights, 52 REV. JUR. U. INTER. P.R. 377, 378 (2018).
30 See id.
31 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (“Acting to guard the general
interest in youth’s well-being, the State as parens patriae may restrict the parent’s
control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child’s labor, and
in many other ways.”).
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juvenile offenders.32 Under this early, paternalistic version of the
juvenile justice system, the primary focus and purpose of the juvenile
court were to further the minor’s rehabilitation and best interests.33
Judicial, cultural, and legislative changes in the late twentieth
century created a more punitive juvenile justice system, shifting the
system’s focus away from rehabilitation and more and more toward
punishment.34 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Kent v. United States,35 In re Gault,36 and In re Winship37
likened the country’s juvenile justice system to the criminal justice
system by extending to juvenile offenders the due process rights
afforded to criminal defendants. During the 1980s and 1990s, a national
rise in crime led to changing views on juvenile justice and the adoption
of “get-tough” laws38 by states throughout the country.39 The notion of
the juvenile “super-predator,” juvenile offenders who committed
violent crimes for trivial reasons, became popular, prompting states to
change legislation regarding the juvenile justice system.40 By 1999, all
but one state had enacted laws allowing or making it easier for juvenile
offenders to be transferred to criminal courts.41
Although the attitudes behind “get-tough” laws persist today,
recent years have seen a growing movement toward recognizing the
differences between minors and adults and how those differences affect
juvenile justice. In 2005, the Supreme Court prohibited death sentences
for juveniles in Roper v. Simmons, which held that death sentences for

32

Peterson, supra note 29, at 383–84.
Id. at 378–79.
34 DANIELLE MOLE & DODD WHITE, TRANSFER AND WAIVER IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM
2–3 (2005).
35 383 U.S. 541, 561 (1966) (holding that before being transferred to criminal court,
juvenile offenders are entitled to a hearing, representation by counsel, access to social
records, and a statement of the reasons for the transfer).
36 387 U.S. 1, 33, 41, 55–57 (1967) (holding that juvenile defendants are entitled to
notice of the charges, a right to counsel, a right to confrontation, and a right against selfincrimination).
37 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is
required in juvenile proceedings).
38 NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 155 (“In response to the
increase in violent crime in the 1980s, state legal reforms in juvenile justice, particularly
those that deal with serious offenses, have stressed punitiveness, accountability, and a
concern for public safety, rejecting traditional concerns for diversion and rehabilitation
in favor of a get-tough approach to juvenile crime and punishment.”).
39 Barry C. Feld, Adolescent Criminal Responsibility, Proportionality, and Sentencing
Policy: Roper, Graham, Miller/Jackson, and the Youth Discount, 31 LAW & INEQ. 263, 266
(2013).
40 MOLE & WHITE, supra note 34, at 2–3.
41 Id. at 3.
33
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conduct committed as a minor violate the Eighth Amendment’s ban on
cruel and unusual punishment.42 Similarly, in 2012, the Supreme Court
also prohibited mandatory sentences of life without parole for juvenile
crimes in Miller v. Alabama.43 In these cases, the Court focused on three
primary distinctions between juvenile and adult offenders to explain
why different punishments are warranted: (1) “[a] lack of maturity and
an underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more
often . . . result[ing] in impetuous and ill-considered actions and
decisions;” (2) “juveniles are more vulnerable or susceptible to negative
influences and outside pressures” and “have less control . . . over their
own environment;” and (3) “the character of a juvenile is not as well
formed as that of an adult. The personality traits of juveniles are more
transitory, less fixed.”44 Roper and Miller affirmed that despite harsher
laws, the primary purpose of the juvenile justice system remains to be
rehabilitation.45 While the rationale and decisions in Roper and Miller
have prevented minor offenders from being sentenced to the most
serious criminal punishments, thousands of juveniles continue to be
tried and sentenced as adults.46
B. California
California’s juvenile justice system also strives, in theory, to
rehabilitate juvenile offenders. California’s Legislative Analyst’s Office
stated that while both the juvenile and criminal justice systems strive to
achieve public safety, “California’s adult system also has punishment of
offenders as a goal, while California’s juvenile justice system has a
different goal—treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.”47
The California Legislature explains that, unlike the adult criminal justice
system, many agencies (such as schools, social workers, and community

42

Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573–74 (2005).
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012).
44 Roper, 543 U.S. 551 at 569–70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 50 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)
(alteration in original)); Miller, 567 U.S. at 471 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
569–70 (2005)).
45 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010))
(“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an
adult.’”).
46 Jessica Lahey, The Steep Costs of Keeping Juveniles in Adult Prisons, THE ATLANTIC
(Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2016/01/the-cost-ofkeeping-juveniles-in-adult-prisons/423201.
47 CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST OFF., JUVENILE CRIME — OUTLOOK FOR CALIFORNIA PART V,
https://lao.ca.gov/1995/050195_juv_crime/kkpart5.aspx (1995).
43
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programs) are involved in the juvenile justice system to help facilitate
rehabilitation of juvenile offenders.48
1. The Welfare and Institutions Code
In California, the procedures for transferring, trying, and
sentencing a juvenile in criminal court are governed by the Welfare and
Institutions Code.49 Welfare and Institutions Code § 707 sets out when
a juvenile offender may be transferred to criminal court, the procedures
by which a judge may transfer the juvenile to criminal court, and the
factors a judge should consider when deciding on a motion to transfer a
juvenile to criminal court.50 Section 707 reflects a number of
amendments to these procedures made over the past several years.51
The most significant of these amendments have been Proposition 21
(the Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention Initiative of 2000),52
Proposition 57 (the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016),53 and
Senate Bill 1391,54 passed in September 2018 as a part of the Equity and
Justice Package and effective as of January 2019.
Proposition 21 exemplified the “get-tough” laws that characterized
juvenile justice legislation in the 1990s.55 It allowed prosecutors to file
certain charges against minors directly in criminal court without a
fitness hearing or transfer order from a juvenile court judge.56 Under
Proposition 21, minors aged fourteen and older accused of committing
major crimes, such as murder and specified sex offenses, could be tried
and sentenced in criminal court at the prosecutor’s discretion.57
Proposition 21 contained “a new list of direct file categories and specific
provisions making judicial waiver easier for prosecutors by expanding
the list of crimes that generate a presumption of transfer and reducing
the burden of proof in the judicial proceeding.”58

48

Id.
See generally CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (2019).
50 Id. § 707(a)–707(b).
51 Id.
52 See generally Prop. 21 § 26 (2000).
53 See generally Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016).
54 See generally Cal. ALS 1012, S.B. 1391 (Cal. 2018).
55 Feld, supra note 39, at 266.
56 Jennifer Taylor, California’s Proposition 21: A Case of Juvenile Injustice, 75 S. CAL. L.
REV. 983, 990–91 (2002).
57 Id. at 990.
58 Franklin E. Zimring, The Power Politics of Juvenile Court Transfer: A Mildly
Revisionist History of the 1990s, 71 LA. L. REV. 1, 10 (2010).
49
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Proposition 57, which limited the broad prosecutorial discretion
allowed by Proposition 21 and put the question of juvenile transfer into
the hands of juvenile court judges, amended California’s Welfare and
Institutions Code § 707 in 2016.59 Proposition 57 stated five specific
goals with regard to sentencing both juvenile and adult offenders:
(1) Protect and enhance public safety; (2) Save money by
reducing wasteful spending on prisons; (3) Prevent federal
courts from indiscriminately releasing prisoners; (4) Stop the
revolving door of crime by emphasizing rehabilitation,
especially for juveniles; (5) Require a judge, not a prosecutor,
to decide whether juveniles should be tried in adult court.60
Proposition 57 eliminated Proposition 21’s “direct file” approach and
required a transfer hearing to be held before any juvenile could be
transferred to criminal court.61 This amendment still allowed juveniles
under the age of sixteen to be transferred to criminal court for certain
crimes pursuant to a transfer hearing.62 This changed, however, with
the enactment of Senate Bill 1391 in 2018.
2. Senate Bill 1391
In September of 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed
Senate Bill 1391, which flatly prohibits the transfer of juveniles under
the age of sixteen to criminal court.63 Under Senate Bill 1391, juveniles
under sixteen years of age must remain in the juvenile system and be
sentenced as juveniles, requiring detainment in juvenile correctional
facilities rather than adult prisons.64 According to the Legislative
Counsel’s Digest on the bill, it
repeal[s] the authority of a district attorney to make a motion
to transfer a minor from juvenile court to a court of criminal
jurisdiction in a case in which a minor is alleged to have
committed a specified serious offense when he or she was 14
or 15 years of age, unless the individual was not apprehended
prior to the end of juvenile court jurisdiction, thereby
amending Proposition 57.65
With this marked change to the juvenile justice system has come
controversy. Even Governor Brown stated that it was a “difficult bill” to
59

Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016).
Id. § 2.
61 Alana Murphy, Recent Court Decisions and Legislation Affecting Juveniles: United
States Court of Appeals, 9th Circuit, 21 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 215, 229 (2017).
62 Id.
63 Koseff, supra note 19.
64 Id.
65 LEGIS. COUNS. DIG., Cal. ALS 1012, S.B. 1391 (Cal. 2018).
60
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sign,” but ultimately did so, asserting that California “should continue to
work toward a more just system that respects victims, protects public
safety, holds youth accountable, and also seeks a path of redemption and
reformation whenever possible.”66 In the year and a half since Senate
Bill 1391 was passed, criticism has included challenges to its
constitutionality, leading to a split among California lower courts.67 This
Comment, however, will not address the constitutionality of Senate Bill
1391 and will instead focus on the other arguments against the
amendment.
III. ADDRESSING THE CRITICISM OF SENATE BILL 1391
There are two traditional categories of criminal punishment:
utilitarianism and retributivism.68 Utilitarian purposes seek to achieve
benefits for the largest number of people.69 There are five typical
mechanisms of utilitarian punishment: rehabilitation, incapacitation,
specific deterrence, general deterrence, and denunciation.70 These
purposes tend to have crime-control effects and benefit society at
large.71 Purposes of punishments relating to retribution, on the other
hand, have to do with notions of justice rather than practical benefits.72
There are various versions of retribution, which differ in what exactly
the principle entails.73 Generally, however, the principles of retribution
direct that offenders must be punished simply because they deserve to
be punished for their crimes.74 In other words, offenders should be
sentenced based on their blameworthiness for their crimes.75 Section A
of this Part will discuss the utilitarian concerns that opponents and
supporters have raised regarding Senate Bill 1391, primarily public
safety and rehabilitation. Section B will focus on rebutting arguments
grounded in retributivism, focusing on accountability for juvenile
offenders. Section C will show how prosecutorial and judicial discretion
play a large role in how these theories of punishment are applied to
66

Koseff, supra note 19.
E.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior Court,
Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (arguing to Santa Clara County
Superior Court that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional).
68 Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 69 (2005) (referring to
utilitarian and non-utilitarian, or retributivist, purposes of punishment).
69 Id.
70 Id. at 70.
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 See discussion infra, Section III.C.3.
74 Joshua Dressler, The Wisdom and Morality of Present-Day Criminal Sentencing, 38
AKRON L. REV. 853, 854 (2015).
75 Frase, supra note 68, at 73.
67
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juveniles and explain why Senate Bill 1391’s removal of discretion
altogether is warranted when it comes to juvenile transfer and
punishment.
A. Utilitarian Concerns: Senate Bill 1391’s Response to Juvenile
Crime
1. Senate Bill 1391 Maintains Public Safety by Accounting for
Irredeemable, Violent Juvenile Offenders
One argument at the forefront of Senate Bill 1391’s criticism is that
it will let dangerous juvenile criminals incapable of being rehabilitated
serve shorter sentences and get released earlier than they would in the
criminal system.76 At the extreme of this argument are those that raise
concerns about letting psychopathic, violent killers back on the
streets.77 Opponents of Senate Bill 1391 rest this argument on the fact
that in California’s juvenile system, offenders are released by the age of
twenty-five.78 Opponents often point to horrendous crimes by juveniles
under the age of sixteen, highlighting calculated, cruel murders to
demonstrate that “some hearts cannot be reformed so easily” and that
some fourteen and fifteen-year-olds “cannot be rehabilitated in a way
that protects the public.”79 In an opinion piece for the San Francisco
Chronicle, Santa Clara County District Attorney Jeffrey Rosen argued
that Senate Bill 1391 removes a “safety net” previously in place and,
under the amendment, the “only choice . . . is to cross our fingers that
[these murderers] got killing out of [their] system[s].”80
The vast majority of juvenile offenders who are affected by Senate
Bill 1391 are not psychopaths. But, in the rare cases in which a
psychopathic juvenile does receive the benefit of the amendment, the
implications of letting such a dangerous criminal back on the streets are

76 See, e.g., Bretón, supra note 21 (“The fear is that [Daniel Marsh, who was convicted
of murder at fifteen years old] would be released by juvenile detention officials at 25.”);
Jeffrey Rosen, Initiative Reformed How California Tries Teens, but New Law Removes
Safeguards, S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 23, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/article/
Initiative-reformed-how-California-tries-teens-13413031.php (“Senate Bill 1391… is
based on a dangerous contention about teenagers: that they grow out of murder.”).
77 See Bretón, supra note 21.
78 Nate Gartrell, Two Men Accused of Gunning Down Woman in Richmand Park Could
Benefit if Brown Signs Reform Bills, EAST BAY TIMES (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.east
baytimes.com/2018/09/28/a-young-woman-was-gunned-down-in-a-richmond-parkfate-of-both-defendants-may-hinge-on-gov-browns-pen.
79 Bretón, supra note 21.
80 Rosen, supra note 76.
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significant. Doing so, however, is not the “only choice”81 under Senate
Bill 1391. The Welfare and Institutions Code provides mechanisms to
extend incarceration of juvenile offenders that are deemed “physically
dangerous to the public.”82 Under § 1800 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code, the Division of Juvenile Facilities may request that the prosecuting
attorney petition the court for an order allowing the Division to
maintain jurisdiction and control over juveniles “physically dangerous
to the public because of the person’s mental or physical deficiency,
disorder, or abnormality that causes the person to have serious
difficulty controlling his or her dangerous behavior.”83 The prosecutor
may then determine whether or not to file such a petition.84 Similarly,
§ 1800.5 allows the Board of Parole Hearings to request the Division of
Juvenile Justice to review any case in which the Division of Juvenile
Facilities has not filed a request pursuant to § 1800 for any juvenile that
the Board deems “physically dangerous.”85
These safeguards provided for in §§ 1800 and 1800.5 adequately
protect public safety from those offenders for whom rehabilitation is
unlikely.86 Under these sections, fourteen and fifteen-year-olds who
commit violent crimes and have not been rehabilitated by the age of
twenty-five likely will not be released back onto the streets as many
opponents of Senate Bill 1391 suggest. Extending incarceration is an
option for such offenders, making Senate Bill 1391’s impact on public
safety minimal. Thus, while such safety considerations are important,
other sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code reveal that allowing
dangerous murderers back into the public is not a likely effect of the
amendment.
Senate Bill 1391 is also not likely to affect the deterrence of juvenile
crime, yet another reason that the amendment will not threaten public
safety. Current evidence indicates that more severe consequences, such
as sentencing juveniles who have committed violent crimes as adults,
does not impact deterrence: “The power of deterrence in serious
adolescent offenders appears to rest in the perceptions of the certainty,
not the severity, of the punishment for criminal involvement . . . . [The]
81

Id.
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1800.5 (2019).
83 Id. § 1800(a).
84 Id. § 1800(b).
85 Id. § 1800.5.
86 See, e.g., In re Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1965) (affirming the trial
court’s decision to extend the defendant’s detention for two years after his twenty-first
birthday pursuant to CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1803); In re J.F., 74 Cal. Rptr. 464
(Ct. App. 1969) (affirming the trial court’s decision to extend the defendant’s detention
under CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 1800.).
82
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severity [of sanctions] will do little to change behavior.”87 Thus,
although critics of Senate Bill 1391 suggest that punishing juveniles
more severely by sentencing them as adults will deter juvenile crime,
that notion is contrary to current evidence. In fact, it seems that
increasing the probability of being punished, rather than the severity of
the punishment, is a much more effective way to promote deterrence of
juvenile crime.88
2. Senate Bill 1391 Furthers the Juvenile Justice System’s
Goal of Rehabilitation
Criticism of Senate Bill 1391 that focuses on the amendment’s
“soft” approach to juvenile crime fails to fully appreciate another
utilitarian principle, which is the ultimate goal of the juvenile justice
system, rehabilitation. Both the United States and, specifically, the state
of California have specified that rehabilitation is the primary goal of the
juvenile justice system.89 Sentencing juveniles accused of committing
serious crimes as adults, rather than allowing them to remain in the
juvenile system, undermines the importance of this goal and hinders
juvenile rehabilitation. This is because the juvenile justice system is
more effective at accomplishing juvenile rehabilitation than the criminal
justice system: a 2010 analysis of all existing studies of juveniles in the
criminal justice system done by the Department of Justice concluded
that juvenile offenders that were transferred to criminal courts had
higher recidivism rates than those offenders kept in the juvenile
system.90 The analysis found this to be especially true for juveniles who
had committed violent crimes.91 Similarly, a 2011 regression analysis
found that juvenile offenders who were transferred to the criminal

87 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 12 n.21 (citing Edward P. Mulvey, Carol A.
Schubert, Alex Piquero, Pathways to Desistance—Final Technical Report, Document
No. 244689 (submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice) (Jan 2014), at 13,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants244689.pdf); see also Frase supra note 68,
at 72 (“[O]ffenders are more sensitive to the probability of punishment than to its
severity.”).
88 Id.
89 See, e.g., Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012) (citing Graham v. Florida, 560
U.S. 48, 75 (2010)) (“‘A State is not required to guarantee eventual freedom [for juvenile
offenders],’ but must provide ‘some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on
demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’); CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST OFF., supra note 47
(“California’s adult system also has punishment of offenders as a goal, while California’s
juvenile justice system has a different goal—treatment and rehabilitation of juvenile
offenders.”).
90 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 12.
91 Id.
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system, and therefore were not placed in the treatment and intervention
programs available in the juvenile system, had higher recidivism rates.92
These conclusions indicate that juvenile offenders sentenced in the
juvenile system, especially those convicted of violent crimes, show more
rehabilitative progress than those sentenced in the criminal system.
This is unsurprising considering that juveniles sentenced to adult
prisons “lose out on the educational and psychological benefits offered
by juvenile-detention facilities.”93 Although adult prisons also strive to
rehabilitate inmates, juvenile facilities provide more opportunities to do
so because rehabilitation is the main goal of the juvenile system, while
the criminal justice system is more punitive.94 While still detaining and
punishing minor offenders, juvenile facilities foster environments that
are more conducive to rehabilitation by engaging detained youth in
“exercise, education, and pro-social activities necessary for proper
development.”95 Juvenile facilities offer resources such as increased
presence of well-trained staff, dayrooms, classrooms, gyms, and
education programs that are less commonly available in adult prisons.96
The juvenile justice system’s focus on rehabilitation also makes it
better equipped to address and treat mental illnesses, which play a
significant role in juvenile crime. Placement in adult prison can
exacerbate mental illness or, even in seemingly mentally healthy youth,
cause mental health issues to arise.97 A 2002 study published by the
National Institute of Health evidences the strong correlation between
mental illness and juvenile crime, finding that approximately seventy
percent of youth in the juvenile justice system in Cook County, Illinois,98
which was used as a sample for the United States generally, suffer from
at least one mental illness.99 Among the seventy percent of detained

92

Kristin Johnson, Lonn Lanza-Kaduce, & Jennifer Woolard, Disregarding Graduated
Treatment: Why Transfer Aggravates Recidivism, 57 CRIME & DELINQUENCY 756, 767–68
(2011).
93 Lahey, supra note 46.
94 See CAL. LEGIS. ANALYST. OFF., supra note 47.
95 Jailing Juveniles: The Dangers of Incarcerating Youth in Adult Jails in America,
CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE 7 (2007), http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/
Downloads/NationalReportsArticles/CFYJ-Jailing_Juveniles_Report_2007-11-15.pdf.
96 Id.
97 See discussion infra Section III.C.3.
98 Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1134 (2002), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/
articles/PMC2861992/pdf/nihms171651.pdf. The authors chose to use Cook County as
a sample because it is urban (and most juvenile offenders come from urban areas), it is
ethnically diverse, and Illinois’s criteria for detaining juvenile offenders are similar to
those of several other states. Id. at 1134.
99 See id. at 1133.
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youth suffering from at least one mental illness, approximately sixty
percent met the criteria for three or more psychiatric disorders.100 The
prevalence of mental illnesses among juvenile offenders is another
reason to keep juveniles in more rehabilitation-focused juvenile justice
systems rather than the criminal system. Minors detained in juvenile
facilities are “required to participate in individualized services to
address behavioral health, disabilities, trauma, and other needs.” 101
Thus, transferring youth offenders that suffer from mental illnesses to
criminal court is not likely to address the underlying problem.
Remaining in the juvenile system, on the other hand, can give such
juveniles a better chance of receiving treatment for their illnesses,
allowing them a greater chance of rehabilitation.102
Although critics have raised utilitarian concerns about public
safety and rehabilitation, the effects of Senate Bill 1391 are consistent
with utilitarian theory. According to utilitarian theory, the costs or
harms of a given punishment should not outweigh its benefits.103 Since
Senate Bill 1391 leaves §§ 1800 and 1800.5 in place,104 it does not
negatively impact public safety. Additionally, research suggests that it
is the probability of punishment, not the severity of punishment, that
has the strongest deterring effect.105 Therefore, punishing juvenile
offenders with more severe, criminal sentences likely will not impact
deterrence. On the other hand, the juvenile justice system is more
effective at rehabilitating juvenile offenders.106 Since Senate Bill 1391 is
unlikely to affect deterrence and public safety while benefiting
rehabilitation, it embodies utilitarian principles because its benefits will
outweigh its costs.
B. Retribution: Accountability in the Juvenile Justice System
Opponents of Senate Bill 1391 also allege the amendment lacks
retribution, suggesting that even if juvenile offenders are not totally
“getting away with” their crimes, they are somehow getting off easier
100

Id.
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 19.
102 Id. (“The rehabilitative services available in the adult criminal justice system pale
in comparison to what is offered to youth in the juvenile justice system.”).
103 Frase, supra note 68, at 72.
104 See S.B. 1391, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 1800–1800.5 (2019).
105 Frase, supra note 68, at 72.
106 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 18 (“The juvenile justice system is designed
to address the needs of youth by offering age-appropriate support and rehabilitative
services. . . . It is also a system that was designed to address the needs of youth who
commit serious crimes.”).
101
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than they deserve by being sentenced as juveniles instead of adults.
Some challenge Senate Bill 1391 because it allows juveniles accused of
heinous crimes to serve out sentences in “comfy juvenile facilities,”
rather than adult prisons.107 Critics have even characterized the
amendment as a “slap in the face” or “hit below the belt” to victims.108
These opponents recognize that the goal of the juvenile justice system is
to rehabilitate juvenile offenders from their criminal directions but
argue that juveniles who commit serious, horrendous crimes like
murder, rape, and kidnapping, cannot be rehabilitated and deserve to
serve sentences in adult prisons, which are less focused on
rehabilitation and more focused on punishment.109 Critics bolster this
argument by noting that juveniles are only tried as adults in “rare”110
cases when “the crimes are so bad,”111 particularly in “serious” crimes
such as “murder, arson, robbery, rape or kidnapping,”112 implying that
the minors sentenced to adult prisons deserve to be there.
This argument fails to account for many realities of California’s
juvenile justice system. First, while sentencing only violent juveniles
convicted of horrendous crimes as adults may have been a goal of the
system, statistics show that goal was not always achieved. From 2007
to 2016, only twenty-eight percent of minors under sixteen years old
prosecuted in criminal court were accused of homicide.113 Robbery
accounted for twenty-four percent and assault accounted for eighteen
percent, while kidnapping and lewd or lascivious behavior only
accounted for two percent each.114 In 2018, nearly seventy percent of
juvenile cases transferred to adult court were for violent offenses.115
This means that thirty-eight percent of juvenile offenders were still
given the most severe and life-altering punishment of being sentenced
as adults for nonviolent crimes, undermining the argument that only a
few truly dangerous and deserving youth are subject to transfer.

107 Lloyd Billingsley, Senate Bill 1391 Functioning as the MS-13 Empowerment Act,
CAL. GLOBE (Aug. 8, 2019), https://californiaglobe.com/section-2/senate-bill-1391functioning-as-the-ms-13-empowerment-act.
108 Bretón, supra note 21; Smith, supra note 22.
109 See Bretón, supra note 21; Rosen, supra note 76.
110 Bretón, supra note 21.
111 Id.
112 Koseff, supra note 19.
113 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 8.
114 Id. at 8 n.16.
115 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA 92 (2018), https://data-open
justice.doj.ca.gov/sites/default/files/2019-07/Juvenile%20Justice%20In%20CA%202
018%2020190701.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2020).
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This argument also fails to recognize that the juvenile justice
system can rehabilitate minors while simultaneously achieving some
kind of retribution and holding juvenile offenders accountable for their
crimes. Harsher punishments can actually violate retributive principles,
which help set the outer limits of appropriate punishments based on an
offender’s blameworthiness.116 When a punishment goes beyond the
limits of the offender’s culpability, it no longer conforms with the notion
of retribution.117 Thus, retribution will be different for adult offenders
than it is for juvenile offenders, who are inherently less blameworthy
for their crimes.118 Additionally, evidence shows that juvenile
correctional facilities are not actually “comfy”119 but rather resemble
adult facilities and face ongoing issues of violence and neglect.120 Most
juveniles who are found to have committed “serious or violent” offenses
are placed in state, rather than county, juvenile facilities.121 The Center
on Juvenile and Criminal Justice’s report highlights how state juvenile
facilities are similar to criminal prisons. For example, the hiring
practices of these state facilities prioritize a corrections background
over a background in youth development.122 The report also shows that
the remote locations of the facilities keep families apart;123 that the
facilities’ schools fail to provide basic education;124 and that the
rehabilitative programs are “rendered less effective by DJJ’s
[Department of Juvenile Justice] violence and prison-like setting.”125
Findings also show that violence and fear run rampant, requiring
juveniles to maintain a level of “hyper-vigilance needed to stay safe.”126
Thus, it is clear that youth held accountable through the juvenile system
rather than criminal sentencing are not let off easy for their crimes.
State juvenile facilities are not comfy, pleasant places to be; they are

116

See Frase, supra note 68, at 76 (discussing the theory of limiting retributivism).
See id.
118 See discussion infra, Section III.C.3.
119 See Billingsley, supra note 107 (referring to juvenile facilities as “comfy” in
comparison to adult prisons).
120 See MAUREEN WASHBURN & RENEE MENART, CTR. ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
UNMET PROMISES: CONTINUED VIOLENCE AND NEGLECT IN CALIFORNIA’S DIVISION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE
7 (2019), http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/unmet_promises_continued_
violence_and_neglect_in_california_division_of_juvenile_justice.pdf.
121 See id.
122 Id. at 21.
123 Id. at 72.
124 Id. at 63–64.
125 Id. at 8.
126 WASHBURN & MENART, supra note 120, at 26.
117
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overrun with problems of fear, violence, and neglect, implying that
reform is needed, not even harsher punishments.127
C. Senate Bill 1391’s Removal of Prosecutorial and Judicial
Discretion in Juvenile Transfer
Under Propositions 21 and 57, prosecutorial and judicial discretion
played large roles in whether a juvenile was transferred to criminal
court or remained in the juvenile system. Under Proposition 21, the
decision to transfer was entirely the prosecutor’s, who could directly file
certain cases in criminal court.128 Proposition 57 curtailed the
prosecutor’s discretion to an extent, as it required a hearing in front of
a juvenile court judge before the offender could be transferred to
criminal court.129 Proposition 57 allowed prosecutors to maintain a fair
amount of discretion, however, because it was the prosecutor’s decision
whether to petition the juvenile court for a transfer hearing.130
Proposition 57 placed the remaining discretion with judges, who then
had the responsibility to decide whether or not to order the transfer.131
Embedded in much of the criticism of Senate Bill 1391 is its elimination
of prosecutorial and judicial discretion to individually assess juveniles
in favor of a flat ban against transfer for juveniles under sixteen.
Opponents argue such transfer decisions should be left in the “capable
and independent hands”132 of judges, giving them the ability to consider
“the most dangerous cases” on an individual basis.133 Under Senate Bill
1391, critics say, “there will be no one left to weigh the danger of an
individual criminal.”134
1. Discretion’s Flaws
While the use of discretion can help ensure that individuals receive
particularized consideration, it also has several disadvantages. Biases
can be a problematic aspect of discretion, especially in the courtroom.

127

See NELL BERNSTEIN, BURNING DOWN THE HOUSE: THE END OF JUVENILE PRISON (2014)
(describing the ways in which juvenile detention facilities harm minor detainees, both
while inside the facility and after release).
128 Prop. 21 § 26 (2000).
129 Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016).
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Rosen, supra note 76.
133 See Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior Court,
Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018).
134 Rosen, supra note 76.
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In addition to lingering explicit biases,135 the legal field has increasingly
recognized another substantial drawback of discretion, implicit biases.
Implicit biases are unconscious “implicit social cognitions that guide our
thinking about social categories.”136 Our implicit biases help us
“naturally assign people into various social categories divided by salient
and chronically accessible traits, such as age, gender, race, and role.”137
Implicit biases consist of both attitudes, which are associations between
a concept or group and an evaluative valence (positive or negative), and
stereotypes, which are associations between a concept or group and a
certain trait.138 Although attitudes and stereotypes are often thought to
be outwardly held, they may also be implicit.139 Thus, implicit biases can
come into play automatically, “including in ways that the person would
not endorse as appropriate if he or she did have conscious
awareness.”140
The American Bar Association has implemented an Implicit Bias
Initiative, which contains a “toolbox” for members of the legal
profession to use “in exploring implicit bias and approaches to
‘debiasing.’”141 The webpage contains several resources that can be
used to understand and test implicit or unconscious biases.142 In
addition to a general toolkit, the page also provides different toolkits
specifically tailored for prosecutors, public defenders, and judges.143
These toolkits contain guidance on how to identify and combat implicit
biases in a criminal law setting.144 Recognizing implicit biases is so
important in the legal field because of the role lawyers’ (especially
prosecutors and judges) decisions play in the lives of others. Implicit
biases can influence behavior “in ways that can have real effects on real
135 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding
the New York City police department had violated the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments by conducting unconstitutional stops and frisks in a racially
discriminatory manner).
136 Jerry Kang, Implicit Bias: A Primer for Courts, NAT’L CTR FOR STATE COURTS 1 (August
2009), http://wp.jerrykang.net.s110363.gridserver.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/
10/kang-Implicit-Bias-Primer-for-courts-09.pdf.
137 Id.
138 Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1128 (2012).
139 Id. at 1129.
140 Id.
141 Implicit Bias Initiative, AMERICAN BAR ASSOC., https://www.americanbar.org/
groups/litigation/initiatives/task-force-implicit-bias.
142 Id.
143 See Implicit Bias & Prosecutors, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, https://www.american
bar.org/groups/diversity/resources/implicit-bias.
144 For example, the prosecutor toolkit explains that taking more time to make
decisions and writing or articulating out loud the reasoning for decisions can help
combat prosecutors’ implicit biases. See id.
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lives.”145 Studies have illustrated, for example, the role that race can
play in criminal sentencing.146
Discretion is a subjective concept, and several considerations, in
addition to implicit biases, can impact it. For example, prosecutors may
consider several variables when deciding whether or not to prosecute a
given case. “Legal, experiential, ethical, and political” considerations
may all factor into a prosecutor’s ultimate decision whether to
prosecute.147 While legal considerations, such as whether the evidence
supports the charges, may be more objective, the prosecutor’s personal
views can also come into play.148 The prosecutor’s own life experiences
likely factor into all of his or her decisions, as does the prosecutor’s
perspective on political consequences and what he or she believes is
ethically right.149 These inevitable considerations show how a
prosecutor’s subjective experiences and beliefs impact a decision that
has the power to change another person’s life.
The subjective nature of discretion and implicit biases have a
special impact on juvenile proceedings because whether to transfer a
juvenile offender to the criminal system is a life-altering decision that
relies greatly on the discretion of prosecutors and judges. Some of the
ways in which prosecutorial and judicial discretion have impacted
juvenile offenders are evident. For example, statistics indicate that
across the United States, racial biases have “negatively impacted
minority youth” in decisions on whether or not to transfer a juvenile
offender to criminal court.150 A 2000 study published by the Center on
Juvenile and Criminal Justice found that the proportions of juveniles
transferred to criminal court and left in the juvenile system do not
reflect the same racial breakdown as that for violent crime arrests.151 In
Los Angeles, the transfer rate for minority youth accused of violent
crimes is approximately double the transfer rate for their white

145

Kang, supra note 136, at 4.
Id. (“[A] few studies have demonstrated that criminal defendants with more Afrocentric facial features receive in certain contexts more severe criminal punishment.”).
147 Sandra Caron George, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?,
18 GEO J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 744 (2005).
148 Id.
149 Id.
150 See Gabrielle M. Thomas, Note, The Fate of Black Youth in the Criminal Justice
System: The Racially Discriminatory Implications of Prosecutorial Discretion and Juvenile
Waiver, 17 RUTGERS RACE & L. REV. 267, 285 (2016) (noting that minority youth in Florida
have a higher likelihood of being tried and sentenced as adults in criminal court than
white youth.).
151 Mike Males & Dan Macallair, The Color of Justice: An Analysis of Juvenile Adult Court
Transfers in California, CTR ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1, 6 (2000).
146
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counterparts.152 Although most prosecutors pride themselves on
making fair decisions, implicit biases are, by definition, biases that we
are not aware we carry.153 Additionally, while prosecutors are typically
considered, and often try to be, more neutral than judges or legislatures
who traditionally receive pressure to look tough on crime, prosecutors
may face this same pressure, but “with the additional burden of lacking
experience in and knowledge of dealing with juveniles.”154 Based on all
of the considerations, both conscious and unconscious, that factor into
prosecutors’ and judges’ decision-making processes, the question of
whether a given juvenile offender will be transferred to criminal court
is highly unpredictable, inconsistent, and dependent upon discretion.
2. How Discretion Has Produced Disparate Results in
Transferring Youth Across California’s Juvenile Justice
System
The subjective and flexible nature of discretion has led to a glaring
lack of consistency and uniformity across California when it comes to
which juveniles are transferred to criminal court. Statistics from 2018
show disparities between juvenile offenders of different races: youth of
color are transferred to criminal courts at disproportionate rates.155
From 2007 to 2016, African American juvenile offenders were eleven
times more likely to be transferred to criminal court than white
offenders, while Latino youth were five times more likely than white
youth.156 Data from 2018 shows that race continued to play a role in
juvenile transfer, with Hispanic youth representing more than half of
juvenile offenders transferred to adult court (55.9%), followed by
African American youth (22.3%), and white youth (17.3%).157
Disparities also occur along geographic lines, with some counties far
more likely to transfer certain minor offenders than others; for example,
juvenile offenders in Sacramento County are nearly twice as likely to be
transferred to criminal court than the state average, while youth in Yolo
County are nearly four times as likely.158 On the other hand, juveniles in
152

Id.
Kang, supra note 136, at 2.
154 WHITE & MOLE, supra note 34, at 9.
155 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 115.
156 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 14; Gov. Brown Signs Bills to End Sentencing
of 14- and 15-Year-Olds in Adult Criminal Court, Support Exonerated People After Prison,
L.A. SENTINEL (Oct. 4, 2018), https://lasentinel.net/gov-brown-signs-bills-to-endsentencing-of-14-and-15-year-olds-in-adult-criminal-court-support-exoneratedpeople-after-prison.html.
157 CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 115, at 47.
158 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 7; L.A. SENTINEL, supra note 156.
153
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Los Angeles County are transferred to criminal courts at a rate of about
half of the state average, while San Diego County youth are transferred
about at approximately a tenth of the state average.159
The vast discrepancies in transfer rates along both racial and
geographic lines exemplify a critical problem with depending on
prosecutors’ and judges’ discretion in transfer decisions. Such an
impactful decision should not depend on arbitrary characteristics such
as race and county of residence.160 Senate Bill 1391 combats this
unfairness by implementing an objective standard for juveniles under
the age of sixteen: they cannot be transferred to criminal court. In doing
so, Senate Bill 1391 takes a major step toward eliminating these
arbitrary disparities and effecting uniformity and consistency for
juveniles under sixteen years old.
3. Senate Bill 1391’s Ban on Transfers of Fourteen- and
Fifteen-Year-Old Juveniles Appropriately Responds to
Discretion-Produced Disparities
While some critics of Senate Bill 1391 have recognized the need to
reduce bias in the transfer process for juveniles, they argue that
Proposition 57 successfully addressed concerns about prosecutorial
discretion by putting the final decision in the hands of a judge. This
argument fails to recognize that, under Proposition 57, prosecutors still
maintained significant discretion in the transfer process, as they still
determined which juveniles would be subject to a transfer hearing.161 In
deciding which juveniles were subject to a transfer hearing,
prosecutorial discretion continued to play a large role in determining
which juveniles would ultimately be transferred because those subject
to a hearing clearly have a far greater chance of transfer. In this way,
Proposition 57 did not actually take the decision away from prosecutors
and give it to judges; rather, “the judiciary merely acted as a check on
the prosecutor’s discretionary decision by ruling on the motions for
transfer, it did not independently decide which charged youths should
be subject to the possibility of transfer.”162

159

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 7.
See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 7, at 14 (showing that juvenile offenders’
chances of being transferred to criminal court are different depending on which
California county the prosecution takes place in); Males & Macallair, supra note 151, at 6
(showing that youth of color are more likely to be transferred to criminal court).
161 Prop. 57 § 4.2 (2016).
162 People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 248 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555, 563–64 (Ct. App. 2019).
160
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This argument also fails to account for the fact that judges’
discretion can be flawed as well. Although we often trust judges to fairly
and neutrally carry out the law, they are not immune from implicit
bias.163
The notion that Proposition 57 effectively addressed
discretionary issues by putting transfer decisions into the “capable and
independent hands” of judges ignores biases in judicial discretion.
Additionally, this argument does not consider whether judges have the
knowledge of juvenile minds and development that is needed to make
informed decisions of long-lasting impact for youth. In Roper v.
Simmons, the Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of making
decisions regarding juvenile sentencing: “It is difficult even for expert
psychologists to differentiate between the juvenile offender whose
crime reflects unfortunate yet transient immaturity, and the rare
juvenile offender whose crime reflects irreparable corruption.”164 If it is
difficult for expert psychologists to differentiate between juveniles who
can and cannot be rehabilitated, judges, many of whom lack
psychological and youth development expertise, undoubtedly will
struggle with making these distinctions as well.
The removal of prosecutorial and judicial discretion is warranted
in light of the difficulty prosecutors and judges will undoubtedly face in
determining whether to transfer juvenile offenders. Today, most states
use the theory of limiting retributivism in criminal sentencing.165 Under
this theory, judges follow the principle of retribution to identify a range
of appropriate punishments for the crime, “setting upper and lower
limits on the severity of penalties that may be fairly imposed.”166 Judges
then use their discretion to determine what punishment in the defined
range is appropriate for the individual offender.167 In the criminal
justice system, judges’ use of discretion to consider the offender’s
character and any special circumstances is appropriate. Juvenile
transfer, however, is a rare case in which the theory of limiting
retributivism does not work. Punishments based on retribution are
fixed by looking at blameworthiness.168 Juvenile offenders, just by
nature of their youth, are inherently less blameworthy than their adult

163 See Kang et al., supra note 138, at 1146; see also Implicit Bias & Judges, AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/diversity/resources/implicit-bias
(providing advice for judges to combat implicit bias by taking more time to make
decisions, writing more opinions, and participating in statistical trainings).
164 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005).
165 Frase, supra note 68, at 76.
166 Id.
167 Id. at 77.
168 Id. at 73.
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counterparts for the reasons articulated by the Court in Roper169 and
Miller.170 Their youth and immaturity both diminish their culpability in
comparison to adults and suggest “a capacity for and a likelihood of
change.”171
The significant and lasting effects that sentencing a juvenile as an
adult can have on the minor make Senate Bill 1391’s complete ban—as
opposed to the criminal justice system’s traditional method of living
retributivism—an even more appropriate response to the inconsistency
that results from discretion and lack of expertise. The “negative
labeling” associated with sentencing a juvenile as an adult can have
harmful and lasting effects on all aspects of the juvenile’s life, including
“employment, social life, and education.”172
These effects are
exacerbated because adult criminal court proceedings are open to the
public, while juvenile proceedings are usually sealed to all but select
people.173 Juveniles who spend time in adult prisons are also more likely
to re-offend than those who remain in the juvenile system, making those
sentenced as adults more likely to end up back in prison.174
In addition to the effects on their lives after prison, juveniles
serving sentences in adult prisons are more prone to abuse. Youth
offenders incarcerated with adults are at the highest risk of sexual
assault.175 Minors in adult prisons are also nine times more likely to
commit suicide than those who are detained in juvenile facilities.176
Many juveniles who suffer from mental illnesses have less access to
treatment in adult prisons and, because of their youth, have little
experience managing the symptoms of their disorders.177 Because their
brains, including maturity and coping skills, are still developing,
juveniles have a higher tendency to act out with reckless behavior,
earning them more aggressive and severe punishments within the
prison walls as well.178
169 Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70 (citing Johnson v. Texas, 50 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)); Miller
v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70).
170 See Miller, 567 U.S. at 472 (citing Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 71 (2010))
(“Because ‘[t]he heart of the retribution rationale’ relates to an offender’s
blameworthiness, ‘the case for retribution is not as strong with a minor as with an
adult.’”).
171 Rachel E. Barkow, Categorizing Graham, 23 FED. SENT’G REP. 49, 50 (2010).
172 Peterson, supra note 29, at 392.
173 Id. at 390.
174 Id. at 392.
175 Children in Adult Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE (2019), https://eji.org/childrenprison/children-adult-prisons.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 Id.

CONNELL (DO NOT DELETE)

898

1/7/2021 10:54 AM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:875

Whether a juvenile will be transferred to criminal court is a
decision of the utmost importance in light of these serious and
devastating long-lasting consequences for juveniles sentenced to adult
prisons. As such, a ban on transferring young juveniles under the age of
sixteen is appropriate to ensure that a wrong decision is not made. This
is especially true when the severe impact on the young juvenile is
compared with the minimal impact that keeping the minor in the
juvenile system has on public safety.179
IV. CONCLUSION
A look at the history of the juvenile justice system in America shows
that the purpose of the system has been, and continues to be,
rehabilitating juvenile offenders.180 Senate Bill 1391 furthers this
objective by ensuring that all juveniles under the age of sixteen stay in
the juvenile system,181 giving them the best chance at rehabilitation.
While the constitutionality of the amendment is currently being debated
throughout California’s lower courts,182 opponents of Senate Bill 1391
have put forth other arguments regarding public safety,183 holding
violent youth offenders accountable,184 and the removal of prosecutorial
and judicial discretion.185 This Comment answers those arguments,
demonstrating that Senate Bill 1391 is sound both as a matter of public
policy and criminal law policy.
Contrary to critics’ assertions, Senate Bill 1391 does not harm
public safety. Despite the fear that it will let violent offenders back on
the street, the amendment does not affect the safety net already in place
in §§ 1800 and 1800.5, which allow the juvenile system to retain control
179

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 1800–1800.5 (2019).
See NAT’L. RESEARCH COUNCIL INST. OF MED, supra note 25, at 157; Roper v. Simmons,
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181 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (2019).
182 See, e.g., People v. Superior Court (K.L.), 36 Cal. Rptr. 3d 555 (Ct. App. 2019)
(holding that Senate Bill 1391 is constitutional); People v. Superior Court (I.R.), 251 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 158 (Ct. App. 2019) (holding that Senate Bill 1391 is constitutional); People v.
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Bill 1391 is constitutional); O.G. v. Superior Court, 252 Cal. Rptr. 904 (Ct. App. 2019)
(holding that Senate Bill 1391 is unconstitutional).
183 E.g., Rosen, supra note 76 (“Proponents of Senate Bill 1391 cannot assure you that
this small subset of 15-year-olds will not kill again. Some will.”).
184 E.g., Billingsley, supra note 107 (characterizing Senate Bill 1391 as “not justice but
a travesty”).
185 See, e.g., Brief for Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Office, C.S. v. Superior
Court, Sixth Appellate District, Case No. H045665 (2018) (criticizing the replacement of
judicial discretion with “a legislative fiat that prohibits any judge from even considering
the issue [of whether a juvenile offender should be tried in juvenile or criminal court] in
these most dangerous cases.”).
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over juveniles who are deemed physically dangerous even after they
reach twenty-five years old, the age of release.186 Additionally, juveniles
who are kept in the juvenile system do not “get off easy;” they are still
held accountable for their crimes, but in a juvenile facility that is
specifically tailored to meet the needs of still-developing young
minds.187 And, in many cases, these juvenile facilities bear a striking
resemblance to adult prisons.188 Finally, Senate Bill 1391 mitigates the
disparities among transfers,189 which are likely a result of prosecutorial
and judicial discretion. Removing discretion is appropriate in light of
the difficulty of deciding which juveniles deserve to be transferred and
the devastating and lasting effects that the criminal system has on
juvenile offenders.190 Thus, Senate Bill 1391’s critics fail to account for
many practical realities of the juvenile justice system. This Comment
responds to such critics by illustrating that Senate Bill 1391 protects
juveniles while holding them accountable, maintaining public safety,
and reducing problems associated with discretion.
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